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The effect of CEO power on bank risk: do boards and institutional investors matter? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Banks are prone to risk-taking due to their high leverage, limited creditor market discipline 
(reflecting deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail guarantees), and the ability to increase rapidly and 
opaquely the riskiness of their assets. Moreover, bank failures can be costly to the taxpayer and 
have adverse effects on the real economy. Not surprisingly therefore, there is considerable 
academic and regulatory debate on the extent to which governance failures have contributed to the 
risk exposures of banks. For example, it is a widely held view that the vulnerability of banking 
sector during the crisis that started in 2008 was at caused by a build-up of excessive risk 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; DeYoung et al., 2013). 
 
In a recent survey of the governance and risk literature, Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016) suggest 
that shareholder-focused governance exacerbates bank risk-taking and that mechanisms are needed 
to safeguard the interests of other stakeholders. Building on that literature, we examine whether 
stakeholders also need protection from the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs. Specifica lly, 
we examine how the executive board and institutional investor pillars of governance interact with 
CEO power to mitigate or neutralize the effect of CEO power on bank risk. We find that CEO 
power is associated with an increase in risk-taking on several measures of bank risk and little 
evidence that this power is mitigated by banks’ board characteristics. We also find evidence that 
risk-taking by powerful CEOs is encouraged by institutional investors.  
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Our results contribute to several branches of the banking literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature on the determinants of bank risk (for a review see Altunbaş et al., 2017) by showing that 
CEO power is a significant driver of bank risk-taking on several risk measures. Second, we 
contribute to the debate on governance in banking (see Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016) by 
providing evidence suggesting that bank boards do little to dampen risk-taking by banks in the 
face powerful CEOs. Third, we contribute to the literature on CEO power, which has shown that 
powerful CEOs can impact financial performance (Adams et al., 2005), earnings management 
practices (Ali and Zhang 2015), dividend policy (Onali et al., 2017), corporate acquisit ions 
(Malmendier and Tate 2008), incentive contract design (Morse et al., 2011), the composition of 
boards of directors (Combs et al., 2007), and the likelihood of engaging in financial misconduct 
(Altunbaş et al., 2018); our results suggest that powerful CEOs also encourage greater bank risk-
taking. Finally, we contribute to the ‘monitoring v short-termism’ debate on the role of institutiona l 
investors (see Callen and Fang, 2013) by showing that institutional investors appear to favor 
greater risk-taking by CEOs. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
The literature on the role of CEO power and the roles of executive boards and institutiona l 
investors in bank risk-taking is relatively limited and ambiguous. Agency theory suggests that 
CEOs have reason to select safer assets than shareholders prefer because CEO wealth comprises 
tangible and financial assets and human capital concentrated in the firms that they manage, 
whereas shareholders can diversify their risk in the capital market (Pathan 2009; May 1995). The 
empirical evidence on the impact of CEOs on bank risk is mixed. For example, Pathan (2009) 
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reports that powerful CEOs in US bank holding companies can control board decisions in a way 
that reduces risk-taking; and Victoravich et al. (2011) report that powerful CEOs reduce risk-
taking in US banks when controlling for CEO equity compensation; they suggest that CEOs 
influence board decision-making to reduce risk. On the other hand, Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle 
(2012) find that powerful CEOs were associated with excessively risky lending practices in a 
matched pair sample of US firms where half the firms specialized in subprime lending; and Adams 
et al. (2005) show that firms with more powerful CEOs pursue policies which result in riskier 
outcomes and suggest that powerful CEOs influence board decisions toward pursuing risky 
policies.  
 
The board of directors is the cornerstone of the internal governance framework (Fama and Jensen 
1983) monitoring executives over the impact of policies on risk and evaluating whether current 
and future risk-exposure is consistent with risk appetite. However, empirical research on the 
impact of board characteristics on bank risk-taking is still in its infancy (Srivastav and Hagendorff 
2016).1 Pathan (2009) reports that smaller boards increase bank risk-taking, but that boards 
characterized by a higher fraction of independent directors pursue less risky policies. Akhigbe and 
Martin (2006) show that firms with independent boards see a decline in their stock volatility over 
the long term. Erkens et al. (2012) find no impact of board independence on bank risk during the 
2008-2010 financial crisis for a sample of large international banks. Finally, Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012) show that banks with a shareholder-friendly board are more disposed to risk taking on some 
measures of risk.  
                                                 
1 Much of the research in this area has been derived from non-financial firms 
(e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2008; Harris and Raviv; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998). 
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Institutional investors also have an ambiguous role in bank governance. One the one hand, they 
can contribute to good governance because they have an incentive to collect information and 
monitor and discipline management to ensure that the firm’s investment strategy is consistent with 
the objective of maximizing long-term value, rather than meeting short term earnings goals 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1987; Monks and Minow,1985). On the other hand, monitoring may 
be costly such that institutional investors sell off their investments in response to unfavorab le 
developments (Manconi et al., 2012). In addition, institutional investors themselves may place 
excessive emphasis on short-term performance, causing management to be overly concerned that 
near-term earnings (Yan and Zhang, 2009; Manconi et al., 2012). Callen and Fang (2013) review 
empirical evidence that supports both sides of ‘monitoring v short-termism’ debate.  
 
3. Model and data 
 
Our baseline specification is the following panel regression:  
 
(1)  𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑖𝑡, measures the risk of bank i in period t. We employ three measures of 
bank risk widely used in the banking literature (see , for example, Altunbaş et al., 2017). The first 
measure is  default risk as indicated by the z-score of each bank, which equals the return on assets 
plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. The z score measures 
the distance from insolvency where insolvency is defined as a state in which losses surmount 
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equity (E< -𝜋) (where E is equity and 𝜋 is profits). Following the literature, we define the inverse 
of the probability of insolvency as the z-score such that a higher z-score indicates that the bank is 
more stable. The second measure is systematic risk, which describes the average stock market 
reaction of each bank to movements on the overall stock market index. It is constructed using a 
simple capital asset pricing model, based on the following equation:  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 +
 and 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate at time (trading day) t. 𝛽0 is the intercept; 
𝛽1 is the systematic risk of bank i at time t; and 𝛽2 is the interest rate risk. The final measure is 
systemic risk, which captures the reaction of individual banks to systemic events. This is estimated 
via the marginal expected shortfall (MES) following the model by Acharya et al. (2017) at a 
standard risk level of 5% as follows:  𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖
5% = 1 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠⁄ ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡  where 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖
5% is the margina l 
expected shortfall of bank i in 5% worst days; 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 is the number of 5% worst days in the market; 
𝑅𝑖 is the average return of bank i in 5% worst days.  
 
Of the independent variables, 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 is an index of CEO power calculated by applying principa l 
components analysis to four proxies of CEO power:  CEO tenure, where a CEOs’ power is 
expected to increase with length of tenure because it helps build decision-making autonomy 
(Combs et al., 2007);  CEO/Chair duality, where the same person holding the CEO and Chair 
positions simultaneously increases CEO power because it diminishes the role of the board of 
directors in controlling CEO decisions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998); whether a CEO is also an 
investor in the firm, because the ‘convergence of interests’ hypothesis predicts that share 
ownership binds the CEO’s economic interests with those of shareholders and provides the CEO 
with an incentive to maximise firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983); and the size of a CEO’s 
network because networks have been viewed as a means for executives to protect each other on 
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their respective boards (El-Khatib et al., 2015). The coefficients for each component of the CEO 
power index, their eigenvalues, and the proportion of the variance explained are reported in Table 
A1. Our executive board characteristics are 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  and 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 which represent board size 
(the number of directors) and board independence (the percent of outside directors), respectively, 
and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the proportion of equity held in a bank by institutional shareholders. 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector 
of other bank-specific characteristics commonly employed in the bank risk literature that includes 
measures of bank capital, leverage, profitability, liquidity, and asset quality. Finally, 𝐷𝑡 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 during 2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise to capture the effects on risk 
of the worst of the financial crisis on measures of risk.  
 
Our dataset focuses on public listed US banks because of the additional information disclosure 
regulations that apply to them. For each bank, we gather information on the characteristics of CEOs 
(tenure, ownership, duality, network size) and executive boards (size and independence) from 
BoardEx. We match this with information on bank level variables (capital, liquidity, loan 
provisions, leverage, profitability and size) from Federal Reserve call reports and SNL Financia l, 
which uses company filings. Market information on daily stock price shares outstanding to 
calculate the bank risk proxies is collected from Bloomberg. From these sources, we are able to 
construct a panel of 960 banks for the period 1998-2015. Summary statistics for the variables are 
presented in Table 1 and definitions and sources are given in Table A2. We initially estimate 
equation (1) using fixed time and bank effects with the bank-specific variables lagged one period 
to mitigate possible endogeneity bias. This might result, for example, from inverse causality 
between some covariates and the dependent variable (e.g., banks with a reputation for excessive 
risk-taking might deter powerful CEOs) and omitted variable bias. Accordingly, we also present 
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results using the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel methodology to obtain 
consistent estimates (Arellano and Bond,1991; Blundell and Bond 1998).  
4. Empirical results 
 
Table 2 provides the baseline fixed effects and system GMM estimates of equation (1) for each 
measure of bank risk. In the system GMM results, the Sargan and Hansen test statistics indicate, 
respectively, that there is no second order serial correlation and that the instruments used are not 
correlated with the residuals. The overall impression from both sets of results is that the interests 
of powerful CEOs and institutional investors are aligned in that both favour greater risk-taking, 
and that executive boards have only a very modest influence in mitigating bank risk taking. The 
coefficients on CEO power are positive and statistically significant in both sets of estimates and 
for each measure of risk. The coefficients on board size are negative but only significant in the 
estimates for default risk; the coefficients on board independence are negative and significant on 
each measure of risk in the GMM estimates, but only for systematic risk in the fixed effects 
estimates. Finally, the coefficients on institutional investors are positive and significant for each 
measure of risk in the GMM estimates and for systematic risk in the case of the fixed effects 
estimates. The coefficients on the other bank specific variables in Table 2 suggest that bank risk 
taking is more likely in larger banks that have relatively weak balance sheets (greater leverage, 
poorer asset quality, less capital and liquidity, and less profitable), and that risk-taking increased 
during the financial crises. The economic magnitude of the coefficients on CEO power, the board 
characteristics and institutional ownership is illustrated in Panel A of Table 5. The table shows the 
impact on risk of a one standard deviation change in each of these variables. For example, such a 
change in CEO power is associated with a percentage point increase of between 0.13 to 1.18 in 
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default risk, 0.04 to 0.30 in systematic risk, and 0.31 to 0.07 in systematic risk. In the few cases 
where the coefficients are statistically significant, the magnitudes of the impact of executive board 
characteristics is generally smaller than that for CEO power, suggesting that boards have only a 
modest dampening impact on CEO risk-taking. The positive impact on risk-taking of institutiona l 
investors is generally smaller than that of CEO power though in the same direction.   
 
We are also interested in whether the effect of CEO power on risk-taking differs across banks 
depending on board characteristics and the degree of institutional shareholders—that is, whether 
they dampen or neutralize the impact of CEO power on bank risk taking as this could have 
implications for policies aimed at reducing risk taking. To this end, we report regression results 
that include interaction terms for CEO power and board characteristics and for CEO power and 
institutional ownership. In these estimates, the coefficients on the interaction terms reflect the 
conditional effects of board characteristics and institutional shareholders on bank risk taking. The 
results for the executive board characteristic interactions are reported in Table 3 and provide little 
evidence of conditional effects of boards on risk-taking by powerful CEOs. The coefficients on 
the board interaction terms are only statistically significant in the fixed effects estimates for 
systemic risk. The economic magnitude of these coefficients is shown in panel B of Table 5 which 
indicates that the impact of a one standard deviation change in CEO power on bank risk is 
dampened by only about 0.02 percentage points in each case. The results for the CEO power and 
institutional investor interaction are reported in Table 4; they provide some evidence of a positive 
conditioning effect of institutional investors on powerful CEOs in the case of systemic risk-taking. 
In all of these estimates (tables 3 and 4), the coefficient on CEO power remains positive and 
statistically significant in both sets of estimates for each measure of risk each case.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
We examine the effect of CEO power on risk-taking in US banks and whether that power is 
conditioned by executive board characteristics and banks institutional investors with regard to risk-
taking. Our results indicate that banks engage in greater risk-taking activity across several 
measures of risk if the CEO is powerful. We find little evidence that executive board size and 
independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence 
risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of 
powerful CEOs. Our results suggest that the interests of powerful bank CEOs and institutiona l 
investors in banks are generally aligned when it comes to risk-taking and that powerful CEOs are 
able to influence board decisions toward pursuing risky policies. 
  
 11 
References 
 
Adams, R.B., Almeida, H., Ferreira, D., 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate 
performance. Review of Financial Studies 18, 1403–1432. 
Acharya, V.V., Pedersen, L.H., Philippon, T., Richardson, M., 2017. Measuring systemic risk. 
The Review of Financial Studies 30, 2–47. 
Adams, R.B., Ferreira, D., 2005. A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance 62, 217-250. 
Akhigbe, A., Martin, A.D., 2006. Valuation impact of Sarbanes–Oxley: Evidence from 
disclosure and governance within the financial services industry. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 30, 989-1006. 
Ali, A., Zhang, W., 2015. CEO tenure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 59, 60–79.  
Altunbaş, Y., Thornton, J., Uymaz, Y., 2018. CEO tenure and corporate misconduct: evidence 
from US banks. Finance Research Letters 26, 1-8. 
Altunbaş, Y., Manganelli, S., Marques-Ibanez, D., 2017. Realized bank risk during the great 
recession. Journal of Financial Intermediation 32, 29-44.  
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-297. 
Beltratti, A. Stulz, R. M., 2012. The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform 
better?  Journal of Financial Economics 105, 1–17.  
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115-143.  
Brunnermeier, M. K., 2009. Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–08. Journal of 
 12 
Economic Perspectives 23, 77–100.  
Callen, J.L., Fang, X., 2013. Institutional investor stability and crash risk: Monitoring versus short-
termism? Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 3047-3063. 
Combs, J.G., Ketchen Jr, D.J., Perryman, A.A., Donahue, M.S., 2007. The moderating effect of 
CEO power on the board composition–firm performance relationship. Journal of 
Management Studies 44, 1299–1323. 
DeYoung, R., Peng, E. Y., Yan, M., 2013. Executive compensation and business policy choices at 
US commercial banks, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, 165–196. 
El-Khatib, R., Fogel, K., Jandik, T., 2015. CEO network centrality and merger performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics 116, 349-382. 
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., Matos, P., 2012. Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: 
evidence from financial institutions worldwide. Journal of Corporate Finance 18, 389–411.  
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics 26, 301–325. 
Harris, M., Raviv, A., 2008. A theory of board control and size. Review of Financial Studies 21, 
1797–1832. 
Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their 
monitoring of the CEO. The American Economic Review 88, 96-118. 
Lewellyn, K.B., Muller-Kahle, M.I., 2012. CEO Power and Risk Taking: Evidence from the 
Subprime Lending Industry. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20, 289–307.  
Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2008. Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's 
reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89, 20–43. 
Manconi, A., Massa, M., Yasuda, A., 2012. The role of institutional investors in propagating the 
 13 
crisis of 2007–2008. Journal of Financial Economics 104, 491-518. 
May, D.O., 1995. Do managerial motives influence firm risk reduction strategies? The Journal of 
Finance 50, 1291–1308. 
Monks, R., Minow, N., 1995. Corporate Governance. Blackwell, Cambridge, MA. 
Morse, A., Nanda, V., Seru, A., 2011. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal 
of Finance 66, 1779–1821 
Onali, E., Galiakhmetova, R., Molyneux, P., Torluccio, G., 2016. CEO power, government 
monitoring, and bank dividends. Journal of Financial Intermediation 27, 89-117. 
Pathan, S., 2009. Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 33, 1340-1350.  
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737-
783 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political 
Economy 94, 461-488 
 Srivastav, A., Hagendorff, J., 2016. Corporate governance and bank risk taking. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 24, 334–345. 
Victoravich, L.M., Xu, P., Buslepp, W., Grove, H., 2011. CEO power, equity incentives, and bank 
risk taking. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1909547   
Yan, X., Z. Zhang, Z., 2009.  Institutional investors and equity returns: are short-term institut ions 
better informed? Review of Financial Studies 22, 893-924. 
  
 14 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean p25 Median p75 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Default risk (z score) 6405 -7.92 -9.67 -7.66 -5.29 4.800 -76.40 6.06 
Systemic risk 6405 0.48 0.00 0.32 0.95 0.796 -21.56 13.19 
Systematic risk 6405 -1.24 -2.23 -0.72 0.01 3.163 -20.00 20.00 
CEO power index 6405 0.00 -0.92 -0.16 0.67 1.227 3.06 3.94 
Board Size 6405 10.77 8.00 10.00 13.00 3.271 4.00 32.00 
Board Independence 6405 0.78 0.71 0.80 0.87 0.117 0.26 0.95 
Institutional ownership 6405 7.45 0.92 3.79 10.77 9.764 0.00 117.40 
Leverage 6405 80.44 75.32 82.86 87.74 10.67 5.41 96.54 
Profitability 6405 0.48 0.35 0.78 1.11 1.793 -9.99 9.51 
Liquidity 6405 22.61 14.30 20.90 29.02 11.935 0.33 86.52 
Loan provisions 6405 0.21 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.459 0.01 5.41 
Capital 6405 10.37 8.02 9.64 11.83 4.194 0.14 65.42 
Size 6405 0.64 -0.53 0.24 1.39 1.740 -3.22 7.85 
  
 15 
 
 
Table 2 
CEO power and bank risk: baseline estimates  
 Default risk Systematic risk Systemic risk 
 Fixed 
effects 
GMM Fixed 
effects 
GMM Fixed 
effects 
GMM 
Lag of risk indicator   0.686*** 
(0.011) 
  0.277*** 
(0.019) 
  0.402*** 
(0.011) 
CEO power  0.108 
(0.050) 
 0.961*** 
(0.164) 
 0.035* 
(0.020) 
 0.241*** 
(0.036) 
 0.253*** 
(0.069) 
 0.054** 
(0.024) 
Board size -0.045*** 
(0.012) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.025) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
Board independence -0.032 
(0.024) 
-0.129*** 
(0.023) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.380** 
(0.161) 
-0.030 
(0.038) 
-0.606*** 
(0.170) 
Institutional ownership  0.002 
(0.004) 
 0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 0.003 
(0.006) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Capital -0.545*** 
(0.084) 
-0.131** 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022 
(0.026) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Liquidity -0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
Loan provision  0.042 
(0.161) 
 1.120*** 
(0.126) 
 0.051* 
(0.027) 
 0.034 
(0.065) 
 0.078 
(0.071) 
 0.107* 
(0.046) 
Leverage  0.021* 
(0.012) 
 0.006** 
(0.003) 
 0.002 
(0.002) 
 0.013*** 
(0.002) 
 0.011 
(0.011) 
 0.007** 
(0.003) 
Profitability -0.047** 
(0.022) 
-0.290*** 
(0.012) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
Size  0.255 
(0.332) 
 0.255 
(0.273) 
 0.027 
(0.071) 
 0.082 
(0.109) 
 0.687* 
(0.370) 
 0.222*** 
(0.055) 
Crisis dummy  4.257*** 
(0.566) 
 2.655*** 
(0.055) 
 0.038 
(0.117) 
 0.065*** 
(0.021) 
 3.297*** 
(0.293) 
 0.022 
(0.018) 
R2 0.671  0.291  0.237  
Observations 6405 5658 6330 5719 6327 5605 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) (p-value) 
 0.226  0.612  0.461 
Hansen test for 
overidentification 
 0.883  0.927  0.941 
Notes Panel fixed effects estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects; independent 
variables are lagged one period to mitigate endogeneity problems. GMM estimates are system GMM and the 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) is the test for the absence of autocorrelation of the error terms at first and second 
order, respectively.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 
CEO power and bank risk with governance interactions 
 Fixed effects  GMM estimates 
 Default risk Systematic risk Systemic risk  Default risk Systematic risk Systemic risk 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10 11 12 
Lag of risk indicator         0.684*** 
(0.011) 
 0.653*** 
(0.012) 
 0.295*** 
(0.018) 
 0.295*** 
(0.018) 
 0.406*** 
(0.011) 
 0.400*** 
(0.011) 
CEO power  0.114* 
(0.000) 
 0.113* 
(0.061) 
 0.050** 
(0.025) 
 0.053** 
(0.025) 
 0.319*** 
(0.072) 
 0.310*** 
(0.072) 
  0.848*** 
(0.157) 
 0.838*** 
(0.206) 
 0.170*** 
(0.025) 
 0.181*** 
(0.027) 
 0.048** 
(0.025) 
 0.050** 
(0.023) 
CEO power*board size -0.002 
(0.005) 
 -0.002 
(0.001) 
 -0.012** 
(0.005) 
  -0.003 
(0.003) 
 -0.002 
(0.002) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
 
CEO power*board   
independence 
 -0.003 
(0.006) 
 -0.003 
(0.002) 
 -0.014** 
(0.007) 
  -0.000 
(0.004) 
 -0.004 
(0.003) 
 -0.001 
(0.002) 
Board size -0.039*** 
(0.012) 
-0.039*** 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.014 
 (0.025) 
-0.016 
(0.025) 
 -0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
Board independence -0.031 
(0.022) 
-0.031 
(0.022) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.031 
(0.038) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
 -0.127*** 
(0.023) 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.356** 
(0.144) 
-0.362** 
(0.146) 
-0.507** 
(0.157) 
-0.496*** 
(0.165) 
Institutional ownership  0.000 
(0.004) 
 0.000 
(0.004) 
 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 0.003 
(0.006) 
 0.003 
(0.006) 
  0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 0.013** 
(0.003) 
 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Capital -0.545*** 
(0.088) 
-0.545*** 
(0.088) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.029 
(0.026) 
-0.029 
(0.026) 
 -0.132*** 
(0.011) 
-0.153*** 
(0.013) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Liquidity -0.018** 
(0.009) 
-0.018** 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
 -0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.033*** 
(0.006) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
Loan provisions  0.070 
(0.171) 
 0.070 
(0.171) 
 0.054** 
(0.027) 
0.054** 
(0.027) 
 0.073 
(0.072) 
 0.073 
(0.072) 
  1.185*** 
(0.131) 
 1.049*** 
(0.131) 
 0.076 
(0.062) 
 0.076 
(0.062) 
 0.101** 
(0.041) 
 0.104* 
(0.042) 
Leverage  0.020* 
(0.012) 
 0.020* 
(0.012) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.011 
(0.011) 
 0.011 
(0.011) 
  0.006* 
(0.003) 
 0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Profitability -0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
 -0.287*** 
(0.012) 
-0.259*** 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.007) 
(0.012) 
Size  0.242 
(0.322) 
 0.241 
(0.322) 
 0.011 
(0.069) 
 0.012 
(0.069) 
 0.618* 
(0.373) 
 0.609 
(0.373) 
  0.290 
(0.278) 
 0.065 
(0.289) 
 0.076 
(0.101) 
 0.074 
(0.102) 
 0.234*** 
(0.054) 
 0.219*** 
(0.054) 
Crisis dummy  4.242*** 
(0.634) 
 4.252*** 
(0.635) 
 0.039 
(0.123) 
 0.027 
(0.123) 
 3.262*** 
(0.288) 
 3.229*** 
(0.291) 
  2.631*** 
(0.056) 
 2.554*** 
(0.065) 
 0.076*** 
(0.022) 
 0.077*** 
(0.022) 
 0.025 
(0.017) 
 0.022 
(0.018) 
R
2
 0.672 0.673 0.293 0.293 0.238 0.239        
Observations 6405 6405 6330 6330 6327 6327  5458 5458 5391 5391 5279 5279 
AR(2) p-value        0.296 0.285 0.908 0.913 0.365 0.345 
Hansen test        0.845 0.855 0.996 0.996 0.945 0.946 
Note: Panel fixed effects estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects; independent variables are lagged one period to mitigate endogeneity problems.  
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. GMM estimates are system GMM. AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond test for the absence of autocorrelation 
of the error terms at second order. The Hansen test is the is for overidentification of restrictions.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Table 4 
CEO power and bank risk with institutional ownership interaction  
 Default risk Systematic risk Systemic risk 
 Fixed 
effects 
GMM Fixed 
effects 
GMM Fixed 
effects 
GMM 
Lag of risk indicator   0.678*** 
(0.010) 
  0.283*** 
(0.019) 
  0.426*** 
(0.012) 
CEO power  0.097* 
(0.053) 
 0.628*** 
(0.117) 
 0.034* 
(0.020) 
 0.226*** 
(0.037) 
 0.206* 
(0.075) 
 0.056* 
(0.024) 
CEO power* institutional ownership  0.007 
(0.010) 
 0.002 
(0.002) 
 0.003 
(0.004) 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
 0.003** 
(0.001) 
 0.005** 
(0.003) 
Board size -0.044*** 
(0.012) 
-0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
Board independence -0.032 
(0.025) 
-0.130 
(0.022) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.349** 
(0.157) 
-0.025 
(0.039) 
-1.087*** 
(0.208) 
Institutional ownership  0.002 
(0.004) 
 0.010*** 
(0.003) 
 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
 0.003 
(0.006) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Capital -0.550*** 
(0.087) 
-0.131*** 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024 
(0.026) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Liquidity -0.016* 
(0.008) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
Loan provisions  0.036 
(0.165) 
 1.121*** 
(0.118) 
 0.057** 
(0.027) 
 0.063 
(0.027) 
 0.077 
(0.072) 
 0.017 
(0.045) 
Leverage  0.023** 
(0.012) 
 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.012*** 
(0.002)  
 0.014 
(0.011) 
 0.005 
(0.003) 
Profitability -0.043** 
(0.022) 
-0.290*** 
(0.011) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.018 
(0.028) 
 0.022* 
(0.011) 
Size  0.209 
(0.320) 
 0.233 
(0.256) 
 0.007 
(0.069) 
 0.086 
(0.108) 
 0.632* 
(0.376) 
 0.162** 
(0.065) 
Crisis dummy  4.268*** 
(0.560) 
 2.636*** 
(0.051) 
 0.026 
(0.120) 
 0.068*** 
(0.022) 
 3.354*** 
(0.294) 
 0.017 
(0.019) 
R2 0.673  0.294  0.238  
Observations 6405 5418 6330 5353 6327 5242 
AR (2) p-value  0.268  0.816  0.459 
Hansen test  0.874  0.993  0.958 
Note: Panel fixed effects estimates are unbalanced panel regressions with bank and time fixed effects; independent 
variables are lagged one period to mitigate endogeneity problems .  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. GMM estimates are system GMM. AR (2) is the Arellano-Bond test for the 
absence of autocorrelation of the error terms at second order. The Hansen test is the is for overidentification of 
restrictions.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
The economic impact of CEO power and governance variables on bank risk 
 Default risk Systematic risk Systemic risk 
A. Baseline estimates (Table 2) 
CEO power    
  Fixed effect 0.133 0.043 0.310 
 GMM 1.179 0.296 0.066 
Board size    
  Fixed effect -0.147 - - 
 GMM -0.056 - - 
Board independence    
  Fixed effect - -0.002 - 
 GMM -0.015 -0.044 -0.071 
Institutional ownership    
  Fixed effect - 0.059 - 
 GMM 0.098 0.225 0.049 
B CEO power and governance interactions (Tables 3 and 4)  
CEO power*board independence    
  Fixed effect - - -0.015 
 GMM - - -0.017 
CEO power*institutional ownership    
  Fixed effect - - 0.293 
 GMM - - 0.488 
Panel A of this table shows the impact of a one standard deviation change in CEO power, board size, board 
independence, and institutional ownership on the measures of bank risk-taking employing the coefficients on these 
variables reported in Table 2. Panel B shows the impact of a one standard deviation change in CEO power 
employing the coefficients on the interaction variables reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
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Appendix Table 1 
CEO power measure: principal components analysis  
  
First 
component 
Second 
component 
Third 
component 
Fourth 
component 
CEO tenure 0.308 0.917 0.198 0.161 
CEO ownership 0.573 -0.282 -0.193 0.745 
CEO duality 0.514 -0.281 0.749 -0.308 
CEO network size 0.559 0.042 -0.601 -0.601 
      
Eigenvalue 1.500 0.961 0.817 0.722 
Proportion of variance explained 0.375 0.240 0.204 0.180 
This table presents the results of applying principle components analysis to four proxies of power based on CEO 
ability to exercise decision-making power. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has served in position at 
given year. CEO ownership is a binary variable equal to 1 if the equity-based compensation of the CEO is greater 
than the direct compensation of the CEO at given year. CEO duality is a dummy variable equ al to 1 if the CEO 
is also the Chairman in a given year. CEO network size is the number of CEO’s with whom the selected CEO 
overlaps while in employment, other activities, or education roles at the same company, organization, or 
institution in a given year. The eigenvectors are reported in orthonormal form. 
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Appendix Table 2  
Data sources and variable definitions 
Variables Source Description 
Default risk SNL Financial Return on assets plus capital asset ratio divided by total by the 
standard deviation of return on assets in a given year. 
Systemic bank risk SNL Financial Coefficient of the return of S&P 500 index in the estimation of the 
two-index market model in a given year. 
Systematic risk SNL Financial Marginal expected shortfall in 5 percent worst days at given year. 
CEO power Authors’ 
calculation 
Derived from the application of Principal Components Analysis to 
four proxies for CEO power: CEO tenure; CEO ownership; CEO 
duality; CEO network size 
Board size BoardEx The number of directors sitting on the board at given year. 
Board independence BoardEx The percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board 
at given year. 
Institutional ownership 
Thompson 
One Banker 
Percent of ownership by institutional investors in a given year  
Leverage Call reports  
The ratio of total book value of liabilities to total assets in a given 
year. 
Profitability Call reports  
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (to book value of total 
assets in a given year. 
Liquidity Call reports  The ratio of liquid assets to total assets in a given year. 
Loan provisions Call reports  The ratio of loan loss provision to total loans in a given year. 
Capital Call reports  The ratio of risk-weighted capital to total assets in a given year. 
Total assets Call reports  Natural logarithm of total assets in a given year. 
Financial crisis dummy Authors’ 
calculation 
Binary variable that takes the value of one in a year of financial 
crisis (2008 to 2010) and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
